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Recent Developments 
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. 
Keane: WHERE CHILD HAS NOT 
REACHED HIS TWENTY-SECOND 
BIRTHDAY WRONGFUL DEATH 
RECOVERY AVAILABLE TO 
PARENTS 
In Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. 
Keane, 311 Md. 335, 534 A.2d 1337, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in a case of 
first impression, interpreted the age limita-
tion set forth in § 3-904(eXl) of Maryland's 
Wrongful Death Act to include children 
who are 21 years old but have not yet 
reached their twenty-second birthday. The 
Act allows recovery of solatium damages 
for the death of an unmarried, non-minor 
child who was "21 years old or younger" 
at the time of death. By examining the leg-
islative history of the Act, the court con-
cluded that the language of § 3-904(eXl) 
was not meant to preclude recovery unless 
the child had already reached his twenty-
second birthday. 
Gregory Thomas Keane was born on 
March 11, 1962. On November 7, 1983, 
while 'unmarried and residing with his 
parents, he was killed in a head on colli-
sion caused by the negligence of Carolina 
Freight Carriers Corporation (Carolina). 
Gregory's parents subsequently brought 
an action under the Maryland Wrongful 
Death Act. The jury found Carolina guilty 
of negligence and awarded the Keanes 
solatium damages in the amount of 
$220,000 for the loss of their son. 
The defendant, Carolina, moved for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or 
in the alternative, a partial new trial on the 
issue of solatium damages. Keane at 337, 
534 A.2d at 1338. Carolina contended that 
the language of the Act precluded the 
Keanes from recovering because Gregory 
was 21 years, 7 months and 28 days old at 
the time of his death and, thus, he was not 
within the class of persons contemplated 
by the Act. In essence, "Gregory was too 
old." Id. at 337-38, 534 A.2d at 1338-39. 
Granting the motion, the trial court en-
tered judgment in favor of Carolina. On 
appeal, the court of special appeals 
reversed and reinstated judgment in favor 
of the Keanes. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari and affirmed the de-
cision of the court of special appeals. Rely-
ing on Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 
309 Md. 505, 512, 525 A.2d 628, 631 
(1987), the court evaluated the meaning of 
the phrase, "21 years old or younger," by 
examining several sources which guide 
statutory construction. Kaczorowski sug-
gests that legislation generally has a central 
purpose or goal and, therefore, the court 
shall look to legislative intent, as "con-
trolled by the context in which [it] ap-
pears" and "as read in the light of other 
external manifestations of that purpose." 
Id. at 514, 525 A.2d at 632. 
The Wrongful Death Act, in its first 
draft, was enacted to provide recovery for 
pecuniary loss suffered by a spouse, parent 
or child of a person killed by the wrongful 
act, neglect or default of another. McKeon 
v. State, Use of Conrad, 211 Md. 437, 442, 
127 A.2d 635,637 (1956). That first act per-
mitted recovery for the pecuniary loss of a 
child for the period from death until the 
time that the child would have reached the 
age of majority. Coughlan v. B. & O. R.R. 
Co., 24 Md. 84, 107-8. (1866). Through 
time, the Act was modified several times to 
enlarge the list of persons that were entitl-
ed to recover, but it was not until 1969 
that the Act was drastically amended to in-
clude the recovery of solatium damages. 
Essentially, these damages include mental 
anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss 
of society, companionship, comfort, pro-
tection, marital care, parental care, filial 
care, attention, advice, counsel, training, 
guidance or education. Md. Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. Code Ann. § 3-904(e)(1). (1984 Repl. 
Vol., 1987 Cum. Supp.) 
Once solatium damages were 
recoverable, the legislature attempted to 
establish parameters for recovery while 
continuing to expand coverage to reflect 
the purpose of the Act. At various times, 
the limitations upon recovery were based 
on the decedent's residence, educational 
status or partial dependency. Keane at 342, 
534 A.2d at 1341. The court noted, howev-
er, that "[t]he educational provision that 
was in the introductory version of H.B. 
461 tends to suggest that recovery up to 
the age of 22 and perhaps beyond was 
within the legislative intent." Id. at 344, 
534 A.2d at 1342. 
"One who enters first grade at age six is 
likely to graduate from college at an age 
beyond the twenty-first birthday and even 
older, if graduate school is contemplated." 
Id. The court rationalized that substitution 
of the educational provision by the "21 
years old or younger" requirement, was 
probably based on the elitist implications 
that are inherent by the inclusion of an ed-
ucational provision. It was obvious to the 
Keane court that all of these modifications 
were designed to expand, not limit, the 
coverage of the Wrongful Death Act by 
adding to the categories of persons whose 
deaths were recoverable and by enlarging 
the types of damages for which recovery 
could be had. Id. 
Consistent with Kaczorowski, the court 
then examined the language of § 3-
904(e)(1) and interpreted it in light of the 
purpose for which it was drafted. The 
court began its analysis by noting that the 
word, "or" in "21 years old or younger" 
serves to establish a contrasting or an op-
posing relationship. Keane v. Carolina 
Freight Carriers, 70 Md. App. 298, 302, 520 
A.2d 1142, 1144 (1987). Thus, these tetms 
represent two distinct groups - the set of 
people who are "21 years old" and the set 
of people who are "younger." The latter 
of these groups needs little explanation. It 
simply encompasses those who have not 
yet reached their twenty-first birthday 
and, therefore, are "younger" than 21 
years old. 
As this is the only plausible interpreta-
tion of the term, "younger", the court 
held that the phrase, "21 years old" must 
include all persons from the date of their 
twenty-first birthday to the eve of their 
twenty-second birthday. To hold to the 
contrary would be completely illogical as 
it would include, at most, a 24-hour period 
(the day of a person's twenty-first birth-
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day). In looking to the statutory language 
of the Act coupled with a legislative 
history fraught with expansive modifica-
tions, the court concluded that the legisla-
ture could not have intended such a 
narrow reading of the Act. 
Consistent with the legislative history, 
the court in Keane, has expanded the pa-
rameters of the Maryland Wrongful Death 
Act to include yet another category of per-
sons for whose death, recovery may be 
allowed. The court now permits an award 
of solatium damages for the loss of an un-
married, non-minor child as long as that 
child has not reached his twenty-second 
birthday. Although the impact of this de-
cision is somewhat limited, it espouses the 
court's policy to continually modify the 
provisions of the Act so that a broad reme-
dial purpose may be achieved. 
-Natasha Sethi 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
Winters: DISBARMENT WARRANT-
ED WHERE ATTORNEY'S 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IS NOT 
SUBSTANTIALLY RELATED TO HIS 
DRUG ADDICTION 
An impaired mental condition or addic-
tion to alcohol or drugs may be a 
mitigating factor in imposing a discre-
tionary sanction, even where an attorney's 
conduct would otherwise warrant disbar-
ment. In Attorney Griwance Commission 
v. Winters, 309 Md. 658, 526 A.2d 55 
(1987), however, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that an attorney's state con-
victions for filing fraudulent state income 
tax returns, conspiring to violate income 
tax laws, and possessing and distributing 
cocaine, warranted disbarment where the 
attorney's criminal activity was not 
substantially the result of his drug addic-
tion or mental disorder. 
In 1975, Richard M. Winters was ad-
mittd to the Maryland Bar. In 1978, while 
his trial practice was substantially expand-
ing, Mr. Winters experimented with co-
caine. He determined that cocaine 
enhanced his ability to work harder and 
longer. Several months later, Winters ac-
knowledged his drug addiction, when he 
"changed his practice of using a standard 
dosage and consumed whatever amount of 
cocaine he had available." Id. at 660, 526 
A.2d at 56. 
Winters continued to practice law and in 
cases where his clients paid him cash for 
his legal services, he intentionally failed to 
report this as income on his taxes. Winters 
used this unreported income to purchase 
additional cocaine, which he began to con-
sume openly. Id. 
In 1983, Winters was charged and found 
guilty, in the Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County, of conspiracy to violate 
Maryland income tax laws and of 
unlawfully and wilfully filing fraudulent 
income tax returns for 1979 and 1980. 
Also, he was charged and found guilty, in 
federal court for the possession and distri-
bution of cocaine. 
Based on these convictions, Maryland's 
Attorney Grievance Commission, filed a 
petition for disciplinary action against 
Winters. The petition alleged violation of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility 
Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A). In particular, 
the petition alleged: 1) violating a Discipli-
nary Rule; 2) engaging in illegal conduct 
involving moral turpitude; 3) engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, de-
ceit or misrepresentation; 4) engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice; and 5) engaging in any 
other conduct that adversely reflects on his 
fitness to practice law. Id. Pursuant to Rule 
BV9b, the matter was referred to the Cir-
cuit Court for Montgomery County for an 
evidentiary hearing, at which time Winters 
was suspended from the practice of law in 
Maryland. That court then filed compre-
hensive findings of fact and conclusions of 
law with the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. The court of appeals concluded 
that disbarment was the appropriate sanc-
tion in this case. 
To begin its analysis, the court of appeals 
noted that Winters' "serious criminal con-
duct would normally call for disbarment." 
Id. at 662,526 A.2d at 57 (citing Attorney 
Grievance Commission v. Osburn, 304 Md. 
179,498 A.2d 276 (1985». In Osburn, this 
court held that convictions for filing fraud-
ulent state income tax returns and for con-
spiracy to violate income tax laws 
warranted disbarment. Moreover, the 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
Rule under 5.11, adopted by the American 
Bar Association in February of 1986 stated 
that disbarment is generally appropriate 
when "a lawyer engages ... in the sale, dis-
tribution or importation of controlled 
substances." Winters, at 662, 526 A.2d at 
57. Winters argued, however, that 
"compelling extenuating circumstances" 
existed for imposing a sanction less severe 
than disbarment. Id. at 663,526 A.2d at 57. 
He asserted that his impaired mental con-
dition, caused by cocaine addiction and a 
"Narcissistic Personality Disorder" was 
resposible to a "substantial degree" for the 
conduct which caused his convictions. Id. 
Although rejecting Winter's argument, 
the court of appeals first recognized that 
"cases indicate that impaired mental condi-
tion or addiction to alcohol or drugs may 
be a mitigating factor in imposing a disci-
plinary sanction, even where an attorney's 
conduct would otherwise warrant disbar-
ment as a matter of course." Id. (citing At· 
tamey Grievance Commission v. Haupt, 
306 Md. 612, 614-16, 510 A.2d 590, 591-92 
(1986); Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
Willemain, 305 Md. 665, 679-80, 506 A.2d 
245, 252-53 (1986». The court stated fur-
ther, however, that "we have imposed 
sanctions short of disbarment only when 
the mental impairment or addiction is 'to 
a substantial degree' responsible for the at-
torney's improper conduct." Winters at 
663, 526 A.2d at 57. 
When comparing the instant case to ones 
involving attorneys with alcohol addic-
tions, the court restated what they had pre-
viously said in Attorney Grievance 
Commission v. Willemain, 297 Md. 386, 
395, 466 A.2d 1271, 1275 (1983): 
We have looked at the shortcomings of 
attorneys in a somewhat different light 
where we have concluded that the acts 
giving rise to the charges against an at-
torney have resulted to a substantial 
extent from the physical and mental 
maladies the attorney was suffering, 
particularly where alcoholism was in-
volved. 
Id. at 664, 526 A.2d at 58. 
In the evidentiary hearing, moreover, 
the court of appeals stated that "Mr. 
Winters has convinced the court that nei-
ther his clients nor his practice ever suf-
fered any adverse consequences as a result 
of his criminal activity." Id. The court fur-
ther stated that "the Court cannot under-
stand how it can logically find that Mr. 
Winters did properly and competently 
function as an attorney, while addicted to 
cocaine, and at the same time find that his 
addiction and personality disorder caused 
his criminal activity." Id. at 664-5, 526 
A.2d at 58. 
The court further opined that, 
this is not a case where the Respondent 
suffered a substantial lack of capacity 
such that he lost control over every as-
pect of his life. The Respondent in-
stead asserts that he "selectively" lost 
control over particular portions of his 
life and the drug addiction is used by 
Respondent as an attempt to explain 
away those matters which have led to 
severe personal consequences, to wit: 
multiple criminal convictions. It is the 
finding of this Court that the Respon-
dent was fully able to function in his 
law practice, in other aspects of his 
personal life and to stop using cocaine 
when he decided to do so. Hence, his 
drug addictions and per-
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